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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The proceeding before the Sixth District Court involved Phoenix Indemnity
Insurance Company (hereinafter "Phoenix Indemnity"), plaintiff and appellant, (naming
its insured Jason David Merrill as a co-plaintiff) and Marlene Yardley and Yardley Inn,
LLC (hereinafter "Yardley"), defendants and appellees, Civil number 9 8 0 6 0 0 2 2 8 .
(R. 1). Yardley negligently injured Merrill in an automobile accident and Yardley's
insurer, Guaranty National, had refused to provide coverage because it claimed a
cancellation for non-payment of premium.
Pursuant to Phoenix Indemnity's uninsured motorist coverage, Phoenix Indemnity
paid the sum of $25,000.00 to Jason David Merrill. (R. 2-3). Upon paying the sums for
which Yardley was legally liable, Phoenix Indemnity brought an action against her and
her employer for indemnification.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j),
UTAH CODE ANN.

(1953, as amended).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue Presentedfor Review:

Was the district court's denial of Phoenix

Indemnity's motion for summary judgment erroneous? (R. 144).
1

Standard of Review:

A district court's award or denial of a summary

judgment is reviewed for correctness. Rinderknecht v. Luck. 965 P.2d 564 (Utah App.
1998) ("This appeal is from a summary judgment, which is granted only when 'there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 'Inasmuch as a challenge to summary judgment
presents for review conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments
do not resolve factual issues, this Court reviews those conclusions for correctness,
without according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions.' Bonham v. Morgan,
788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989) (per curiam). Accord Universal Underwriters Ins, Co. v.
State Farm MuL Auto, Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1270, 1272-73 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)."). This
Court will view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to Phoenix Indemnity. See United Park City Mines Co. v.Greater Park City
Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 235
(Utah 1993); KAT. Inc. v. Koroulis. 888 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah 1994).
Issue Presented for Review:

Does an implied contract of indemnity arise, as

a matter of law, between an uninsured motorist and her victim's UM carrier requiring the
uninsured motorist to indemnify and fully reimburse the UM carrier? (R. 35).
Standard of Review:

Question of law reviewed under a correction of error

standard. See Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990).

2

STATEMENT O F THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDING, AND
DISPOSITION BELOW.

Phoenix Indemnity filed a motion for partial summary judgment on or about
December 3, 1999. (R. 144). Phoenix Indemnity argued that Yardley entered into an
implied contract of indemnity with Phoenix Indemnity by failing to be insured at the time
she injured Phoenix Indemnity's insured. On or about December 27, 1999, Defendants
filed a memorandum in opposition arguing that no implied contract arose from
Defendants' conduct or failure to be insured, and that Phoenix Indemnity's exclusive
remedy was subrogation. (R. 219). On or about January 19, 2000, Phoenix Indemnity
filed its reply memorandum setting forth additional authorities for the proposition that the
doctrine of implied indemnity was properly applied to uninsured motorists and UM
carriers. (R. 269). After a hearing, the district court ruled that no Utah precedent existed
to support the establishment of an implied contract and, therefore, denied Phoenix
Indemnity's motion on or about March 21, 2000. (R. 474).
A jury trial was held on issues of negligence on March 20 - 22, 2000 and the jury
found Yardley to be 60% at fault for the accident. (R. 542). A final order dismissing the
matter was entered by the district court on or about August 3, 2000. (R. 578).

II.
1.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 20, 1997, at approximately 5:30 p.m., at or near the intersection
3

of 200 South and 200 East, Manti, Utah, two vehicles collided. (R. 148).
2.

Yardley operated one of the two vehicles involved in the collision and Jason

David Merrill operated the other. (R. 148).
3.

As a result of the collision, Jason David Merrill suffered certain injuries and

expenses which were submitted to and paid by Phoenix Indemnity under the personal
injury protection coverage ("PIP") provided under an insurance policy insuring the
vehicle driven by Mr. Merrill. (R. 148).
4.

Jason Merrill's medical expenses and injuries which arose out of the accident

were of the type and in the degree that his right to maintain a cause of action for general
damages was not abrogated by the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. (R. 148).
5.

Subsequent to the above-referenced collision, Mr. Merrill retained the law

firm of Robert J. Debry & Associates to represent him with respect to recovery of medical
expenses which were not covered by his PIP coverage, future medical expenses, and
general damages. (R. 148).
6.

Yardley's purported insurance company, Guaranty National Insurance

Company, refused to defend or indemnify Yardley because it denied that it insured
Yardley on the date of the accident. (R. 148).
7.

Guaranty National filed a declaratory judgment action in the Third District

Court against Yardley on February 25, 1998 attempting to establish Guaranty's lack of an
obligation under the insurance contract based upon its allegation that Yardley had failed
4

to pay the required premium. (R. 148).
8.

On or about May 14, 1998, Mr. Merrill's attorney, G. Steven Sullivan,

represented to Phoenix Indemnity that Yardley was uninsured based upon his discussions
with Yardley's then-attorney, Michael Thompson, and Guaranty's attorney, Jill Zender.
(R. 148); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-305(2)(c).
9.

Phoenix Indemnity determined that Yardley was uninsured under the terms of

its insurance policy and under Utah law. (R. 148).
10.

On or about June 10, 1998, the present attorney for Yardley, Ralph

Dewsnup, advised Mr. Merrill's attorney that Yardley was not insured under any other
insurance policy at the time of the accident. (R. 148).
11.

Phoenix Indemnity fully investigated the facts surrounding the collision, it

considered the evidence presented to it (including its PIP file and the settlement brochure
provided by Mr. Merrill's personal injury attorneys), and determined that the majority of
the fault for the accident rested with Yardley. (R. 148).
12.

On or about July 1, 1998, Phoenix Indemnity agreed to provide UM

coverage to Mr, Merrill and, (1) in the discharge of its duty to Mr. Merrill and (2) for
practical business considerations, settled with Mr. Merrill for the sum of $25,000.00. (R.
148).
13.

In connection with its effort to enforce its implied indemnity contract with

Yardley, Phoenix Indemnity has incurred attorney fees in the sum of one-third the amount
5

recovered from Yardley. (R. 148).
14.

It is appropriate that a summary judgment enter against Yardley in the sum

of $40,868.00.

6

SUMMARY O F THE ARGUMENT
Phoenix Indemnity conferred a substantial benefit upon Yardley by, in essence and
effect, defending her against liability for her negligence and by paying the sums that she
ought to have paid. Therefore, Phoenix Indemnity is entitled to be indemnified lest
Yardley be unjustly enriched and thereby encouraged to continue to operate uninsured
vehicles.1
On October 20, 1997, Defendant Marlene T. Smith, a.k.a. Marlene Yardley while
acting within the course and scope of her employment with the Yardley Inn, a Utah
limited liability company ("Yardley"), failed to yield the right of way at a four-way
intersection which was not governed by any traffic signals. Yardley's failure to yield the
right of way proximately resulted in Jason Merrill's injuries. Phoenix Indemnity
Insurance Company ("Phoenix Indemnity") insured Jason Merrill, and Yardley was

1

The public policy that uninsured motorists should indemnify UM carriers is
especially important where, as here, Yardley asserts that she carried insurance. Insurers
like Yardley's insurance company, Guaranty National, frequently deny coverage willynilly under the mistaken belief that a UM carrier will simply step into the breach.
Common "wisdom" holds that the UM carrier "clearly" is not in "privity of contract" and
therefore the "direct-action rule" operates to "clearly" prohibit an action by the UM
carrier against the third-party carrier which "clearly" "has no coverage" because the UM
carrier "clearly" only "steps in shoes." The mere recitation of the above-quoted, widelymisunderstood bromides convinces liability carriers to deny coverage or a defense to their
insureds without a valid basis because it is highly profitable. Liability carriers should be
encouraged to pay what they owe and to defend their insureds. This public policy can
best be achieved by clarifying the rights of the UM carrier to enforce its equitable rights
as set forth herein. Simply stated: UM carriers have resources to sue miscreant insurers,
while many, if not most, insureds do not.
7

uninsured as defined by statute.
Jason Merrill demanded relief from Yardley's purported insurance company
(Guaranty National), but it refused to provide liability coverage for Yardley because she
had not paid the required premium. Yardley knew of Mr. Merrill's demands and refused
to participate personally. Because of Yardley's failure to be insured and refusal to
maintain her own defense, Jason Merrill demanded relief from Phoenix Indemnity under
his uninsured motorist coverage ("UM" coverage). Phoenix Indemnity adjusted and paid
Mr. Merrill's claim as if it were the liability carrier for Yardley.
Under Utah's statutory scheme requiring all motorists to maintain liability
coverage combined with statutorily-required2 uninsured motorist coverage, an implied
contract arose between Yardley and Phoenix Indemnity. Subsequent to Phoenix
Indemnity's payment of UM benefits to Mr. Merrill, it became entitled to indemnity from
Yardley.
It is appropriate and equitable to enter a judgment against Yardley for the sum
which was paid by Phoenix Indemnity as a result of Yardley's negligence. It is not
inequitable to hold Yardley responsible for obligations she undertook by way of the
implied contract with Phoenix Indemnity.

2

UM coverage is required in the absence of an express, written rejection by an
insured who is informed about the coverage.
8

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT'S ORDER ON PHOENIX INDEMNITY'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS A FINAL JUDGMENT
SUBSEQUENT TO THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL; THEREFORE
THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION.

This Court has adopted an exception to the general rules relied upon by Yardley in
her motion for summary disposition. Yardley argues that because the jury's judgment
was satisfied by her insurance company, this appeal is moot.
An exception to this rule exists only if the appeal relates to a
separate and distinct part of the controversy and the disposition
of one cannot affect the disposition of the other. Id., see also,
Jacobsen, Morrin & Robbins Const. Co. v. Saint Joseph High School
Bd., 794 P.2d 505, 506-07 (Utah App. 1990).
Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co.. 828 P.2d 496 (Utah App. 1992); see also West Valley City v.
Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991). This appeal relates only to the
separate and distinct issue of whether an implied contract of indemnity arose between
Yardley as an uninsured motorist and Phoenix Indemnity as her victim's UM carrier.
Moreover, Phoenix Indemnity explicitly reserved its right to appeal and conditioned the
receipt of Yardley's payment on the appeal of this issue.
If a judgment is entered as to one part of a controversy, which is
separate and distinct from another part, and the disposition of the
latter cannot affect the disposition of the former, a party may accept
the money or property to which he is entitled, and not be deemed
to waive his right to appeal as to other independent claims which
the court refused to grant.
Jensen v. Eddv. 514 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1973) (emphasis added). The general rule
9

from which the above-quoted exception is derived
is based upon the reasoning that when a controversy has come to rest
the litigation should cease. But pertinent to the problem here is an
ancient aphorism: "If the reason for the rule is not present, the rule
does not apply." Therefore, the general rule just stated does not
usually prevent an appeal as to separate and independent claims
where the controversy has not so come to rest.
Id. This case has not come to rest by way of Yardley's partial payment because Phoenix
Indemnity is entitled to recover the sums it is owed under its contract of indemnity.
Subjecting its contractual rights to the jury's determination of the amount of damages
recoverable was error by the district court.
A court of equity will endeavor, to the extent of its powers, to bind
men's consciences so far as they can be bound to a true and literal
performance of their agreements, and will not suffer them to depart
from their contracts at pleasure, leaving the party with whom
they have contracted to the mere chance of any damages which a
jury may give. It will, therefore, in a proper case, enforce a contract
by enjoining violations of the terms thereof.
Disabled Am. Veterans v. Hendrixson. 340 P.2d 416 (Utah 1959) (quoting 28 Am. Jur.,
page 270, section 77).

10

II.

UTAH'S PUBLIC POLICY EXPRESSED BY THE FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY STATUTE CREATED, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, AN IMPLIED CONTRACT OF INDEMNITY BETWEEN
YARDLEY AND PHOENIX INDEMNITY.

Phoenix Indemnity 's right of indemnification arises from the fact that it was
compelled by the Financial Responsibility statute3 to pay Yardley's obligation, and if
Phoenix Indemnity's right of indemnification were denied, such action would unjustly
enrich Yardley.
Utah's automobile insurance regime is sometimes referred to as owners or
operators security and consists of, in general terms, liability coverage, no-fault (i.e., PIP
coverage), uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, and property damage coverage.
These coverages (whether addressed collectively or individually) have been referred to
herein as the "Financial Responsibility" statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12a-101.
The comprehensive automobile insurance regime was initiated in the early 1970s
and arose out of Utah's public policy favoring the protection of innocent victims by
requiring all motorists to maintain certain coverages. By enacting the Financial
Responsibility Act, the Legislature expressed its "interest in creating a more efficient
process for liquidating personal injury claims and providing an incentive for persons
driving Utah's highways to obtain motor vehicle insurance." Warren v. Melville. 937

3

An "uninsured motorist" includes someone who has insurance but whose
"coverage for an accident is disputed by the liability insurer for more than 60 days."
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-305(2)(c).
11

P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1997) (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie. 606 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Utah
1980) (stating that in coupling Utah's no-fault statute with the Motor Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Act, "the obvious legislative intent was to encourage compliance with the
security provisions of the act.")).
The adoption of the Financial Responsibility statute "substantially changed the
public policy of this state by mandating that all Utah automobiles be covered by certain
types of security." Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call. 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985)
(invalidating a household exclusion clause below statutory minimums after the enactment
of mandatory automobile liability insurance). The Call court rejected the argument that it
should adopt the conclusions arrived at by foreign courts "since they were decided prior
to the enactment of the no-fault automobile insurance laws and the requirement of
mandatory automobile insurance." IcL; see also Dairvland Insurance Co. v. Smith, 646
P.2d 737 (Utah 1982) (refusing to recognize follow Utah caselaw pre-dating the
legislature's enactment of the Financial Responsibility statute).
The comprehensive and mandatory nature of modern insurance law establishes an
interrelationship between formerly unrelated entities. The relationship that is relevant to
this Appeal is the UM carrier's provision of substitute liability coverage to uninsured
motorists. Because the Financial Responsibility statute sets forth UM coverage as a
required piece of the interdependent puzzle, uninsured motorists implicitly enter into a
contractual relationship with the UM carrier that acts on behalf of the uninsured motorist.
12

Were it not so, people like Yardley and insurers like Guaranty would be encouraged to
refuse to comply with the security provisions of the Financial Responsibility statute in
violation of the central legislative purpose thereof.
UM coverage is only provided because of the uninsured motorist's fault in failing
to maintain liability coverage or the liability carrier's refusal to fulfill its obligations. For
the foregoing reasons, among others, an implied contract arises, as a matter of law, at the
time a payment is made under UM coverage. No similar implied contract arises from
payments under collision coverage, comprehensive coverage, or PIP coverage because the
payments under those coverages are to be paid by the first-party insurer without regard to
the liability of the tortfeasor and without regard to the tortfeasor's maintenance of
mandatory coverage.4

4

When an insurer seeks reimbursement of benefits paid under coverages other
than UM coverage, the amount of reimbursement is properly determined according to
principles of subrogation (i.e., tort principles and comparative negligence). However,
indemnity requires "full reimbursement" of the amount of loss paid (of course, a UM
claim is adjusted under tort principles and UM carriers invoke apportionment under the
comparative negligence statute) because it is an action on a contract (i.e., an implied
contract).
Moreover, an action for indemnity can also be brought by the secondary insurer
against the primary insurer to determine the primary insurer's contractual obligations.
See Peterson v. Western Cas. and Sur. Co.. 425 P.2d 769 (Utah 1967) ("this action may be
looked at somewhat differently than it would be in a suit between the primary parties to the
insurance contract. As a member of the public injured by the insured, plaintiff became a
third-party beneficiary of the policy, but she had no control over the conduct of the parties
inter se. * * * there exists at least a temptation for an insurer to merely go through the
motions of seeking the insured's cooperation without actually desiring it, and thus establish a
defense to liability on the policy. * * * Inasmuch as the purpose of the insurance is to
13

III.

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE UNINSURED MOTORIST
STATUTE AND THE REST OF THE FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY ACT GIVES RISE TO AN IMPLIED
CONTRACT OF INDEMNITY.

Utah's public policy and statutory enactments require all motorists to maintain a
minimum amount of liability insurance for the protection of innocent victims. This public
policy would be frustrated if uninsured motorists were permitted to freely demand a
defense and indemnification under the uninsured motorist coverage purchased by their
victims or if primary liability carriers were encouraged to refuse payment of required
benefits to their insureds.5 Therefore, an uninsured motorist or his or her primary insurer
must fully reimburse6 a UM carrier that provides insurance for the uninsured motorist lest
protect not only the insured, but the public generally, the right which arises in anyone injured
by an insured motorist should not be regarded lightly, nor permitted to be subverted by other
parties over whom the injured one has no control.").
5

"These holdings are indefensible. The courts are ignoring realities and
encouraging insurers who are not concerned with their obligations to their insured in the
hope that someone else will step into the breach.. . . Further, as a matter of public policy,
courts should be demanding that insurers give prompt defense of claims to policyholders
rather than to tolerate the shifting of responsibility with such impunity." Sharon Steel
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997) (quoting 7c John Allan
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4691, at 278 (Walter F. Berdal ed., 1979)).
6

Conceptually, it is instructive to consider the implied contract of indemnity and
subsequent full reimbursement as the belated payment of insurance premiums by the
"uninsured motorist." All motorists are required to maintain pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN. § 41-12a-301(2). Normally, an insured pays a premium for an insurance policy.
This premium is calculated by the actuarial determination of the pooled risk of certain
fortuitous events occurring to individuals who are part of a group of persons covered by
the insurance company. Therefore, the premiums are low. However, insurance
purchased subsequent to the happening of an event will reflect the true cost of the loss
14

the uninsured motorist and/or her insurer become freeloaders. If freeloaders were not
required to indemnify those who have paid their obligations, the freeloaders would be
provided an incentive to refrain from maintaining insurance or paying insurance benefits.
The present system of insurance would crumble under the weight of individual and
corporate freeloaders.
When, under the direction of statute, an insurance company acts in the place of an
uninsured motorist, it is upon the implicit and equitable assumption that the UM carrier is
to be indemnified by the uninsured motorist or their liability carrier for expenses incurred
and payments made in the course of the transaction. The duty to indemnify is imposed
(without respect to the indemnitor's acknowledgment of the duty) unless there is an
express agreement to the contrary. The Restatement of Restitution states the general rule
as follows:
A person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty which is
owed by him but which as between himself and another should have
been discharged by the other, is entitled to indemnity from the other .

Restatement of Restitution, Title A, Indemnity at § 76; see also Hanover Limited v.
Cessna Aircraft Co.. 758 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting § 76 of the Restatement).
And the authors of C.J.S. describe the duty of indemnity as follows:

rather than the anticipated cost of a fortuitous loss multiplied by the risk of loss. Full
reimbursement is just another way of expressing the cost of purchasing insurance to cover
an event that has already happened where the costs and expenses are already determined.
15

One compelled to pay damages on account of the negligent or
tortious act of another has a right of action against the latter for
indemnity.
42 CJ.S. Indemnity § 21, page 596.

A.

Yardley Was an Uninsured Motorist.

Despite the statutory requirement that all motorists in Utah maintain liability
insurance, Yardley was uninsured. The Utah Supreme Court has explained that
mandatory liability insurance coverage "reflects a public policy requiring minimum
coverage to protect innocent victims of automobile accidents." Farmers Insurance
Exchange v. Call. 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985). Under the Financial Responsibility statute
an "uninsured motorist" includes someone who has insurance but whose "coverage for an
accident is disputed by the liability insurer for more than 60 days." UTAH CODE ANN. §
31A-22-305(2)(c).7

7

The above-quoted statute may be interpreted as a codification of the
common-law principle that a person whose claimed insurer denies coverage (and, by
analogy and legal effect, that person's substitute liability carrier (a.k.a. the victim's UM
carrier)) "is entitled to exercise the judgment of a prudent uninsured person in
compromising the claim." Gibbs Smith, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar., 949 P.2d 337
(Utah 1997) (quoting Simon v. Maryland Cas. Co.. 353 F.2d 608, 612 (5th Cir. 1965)).
Moreover, "when an insurer disclaims liability on the basis of noncoverage, not only may
the insured bring an action against the insurer, but in addition 'the insurer is bound by
any reasonable compromise or settlement made by the insured.'" Id (quoting Waugh
v. American Cas. Co.. 378 P.2d 170, 177 (Kan. 1963)).
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B.

The Role of The Uninsured Motorist Carrier.

Phoenix Indemnity would not have owed any duty to its insured, Jason Merrill, for
his general damages and medical bills in excess of $3,000 were it not for Yardley's
failure to provide liability insurance. Phoenix Indemnity's duty arose because of
Yardley's fault (i.e., her failure to comply with the requirements of the Financial
Responsibility statute). Phoenix Indemnity, in effect, defended Yardley against the
claims made by Phoenix Indemnity's insured because its duties were exactly coextensive
with Yardley's duties. The Utah Supreme Court explained the nature of uninsured
motorist coverage and the relationship between UM carriers and uninsured motorists in
Chatterton vs. Walker as follows:
The district court's attempt to enforce distinctions between [the
uninsured motorist's] interests and [the UM carrier's] interests thus
served no valid end. "The purpose of mandatory uninsured-motorist
insurance is 'protection equal to that which would be afforded if the
offending motorist carried liability insurance.... The insurer
stands in the shoes of the uninsured motorist and must pay if [the
uninsured motorist] would be required to pay.'" Fetch, 530 N.W.2d
at 339 {quoting 8C John A. Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance
Law and Practice, § 5086, at 307, 309-10).
Chatterton v. Walker. 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 1997) (discussing the right of a UM carrier to
intervene in insured's action against uninsured motorist) (footnotes, etc. omitted,
emphasis added). In other words, Phoenix Indemnity's obligations toward its insured as
the substitute liability carrier for Yardley was exactly coextensive with the duties owed
by Yardley and only arose because of her fault (i.e., her failure to provide liability
17

coverage or a defense).

IV.

PRINCIPLES OF IMPLIED INDEMNITY ARE PROPERLY
APPLIED TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UM
CARRIER AND THE UNINSURED MOTORIST.

As a preliminary matter, Phoenix Indemnity acknowledges that there is no reported
appellate case in the State of Utah which directly addresses the interplay between the
doctrine of implied indemnity and the uninsured motorist statute. However, Utah has
adopted the common law. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-1 (adopting common law as rule
of decision in Utah courts).
A rule of law, whether preexisting or newly established, that serves
as the major premise of an adjudicatory syllogism, necessarily
governs all subsequent cases properly falling within the scope of the
rule. This is so even when the particular facts in subsequent cases
are different and res judicata does not apply.
Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain States Tel.. 846 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1992). And
courts in other states have applied the doctrine of implied indemnity to uninsured motorist
coverage. See, e.g.. Coleman v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co.. 930 F.
Supp. 255 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (anticipating Mississippi law); See also Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.. 471 F.Supp. 1059 (M.D. Penn. 1979)
(acknowledging the right of a UM carrier to sue a liability carrier and collect full
reimbursement without respect to the liability carrier's coverage limits based upon the
doctrine of equitable indemnification under § 76 of the Restatement where the liability
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carrier wrongfully denied coverage to its insured causing the UM carrier to step into the
breach caused by the liability carrier's wrongful conduct and to pay its insured under its
uninsured motorist coverage).
There are three elements of equitable8 indemnity. First, the prospective indemnitee
(Phoenix Indemnity) must discharge a legal obligation owed to a third party (Jason
Merrill). Second, the prospective indemnitor (Yardley) must also be liable to the third
party (Jason Merrill). Third, as between the prospective indemnitor (Yardley) and the
prospective indemnitee (Phoenix Indemnity), the obligation should be paid by the
indemnitor (Yardley). See Salt Lake City Sch. Dist. v. Galbraith & Green. Inc.. 740 P.2d
284 (Utah App. 1987); Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah
1984).
The uninsured motorist statute provides as follows:
(3) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection
31A-22-302(l)(b) provides[9] coverage for covered persons[10] who
are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of

8

Equitable indemnity is also called "common-law indemnity" and "implied
indemnity," and these three terms may be used interchangeably herein.
9

UM coverage is provided by insurance companies, and insurers providing UM
coverage are "indemnitees" under the doctrine of implied indemnity.
10

"Covered persons" under the uninsured motorist coverage statute are "third
persons" to whom a debt is paid by the indemnitee on behalf of the indemnitor under the
doctrine of implied indemnity.
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uninsured motor vehicles[n] because of bodily injury, sickness,
disease, or death in limits that at least equal the minimum bodily
injury limits for motor vehicle liability policies under Section
31A-22-304.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-22-305.

First, Phoenix Indemnity discharged a legal obligation governed by UTAH CODE
ANN. § 31A-22-305 and its insurance policy under which it was obligated (coextensively
with Yardley, but contingent upon her failure to provide liability insurance) to pay the
liability of Yardley for its insured's damages. Second, Yardley was also liable
(coextensively with Phoenix Indemnity, but Yardley's obligation was primary) to pay the
damages suffered by Jason Merrill. Third, as between Yardley and Phoenix Indemnity,
the obligation should be paid (should have been paid originally12) by Yardley. See Salt
Lake City Sch. Dist. v. Galbraith & Green. Inc., 740 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 1987); Perry v.
Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d214, 218 (Utah 1984).

11

"Owners or operators of uninsured vehicles" are "indemnitors" under the
doctrine of implied indemnity who implicitly agree to indemnify the indemnitee (the
uninsured motorist carrier is the "indemnitee") for the sums paid to the third persons (i.e.,
"covered persons" or the "indemnitee's insured").
12

It is the very nature of uninsured motorist coverage to be secondary. In other
words, Phoenix Indemnity's obligation to indemnify Yardley's insured would not have
arisen had Yardley fulfilled its obligation to provide liability insurance (i.e., Phoenix
Indemnity's obligation would not have arisen in the absence of Yardley's fault).
20

V.

IMPLIED INDEMNITY AND SUBROGATION ARE
DIFFERENT, BUT NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.

The primary (but superficial) objection to the proper application of the principle of
implied indemnity to the uninsured motorist / UM carrier situation is the assertion that the
UM carrier's exclusive remedy is subrogation.13 Such conclusory objections are without
merit.
The principle of indemnity is closely interrelated with the principle
of subrogation, and oftentimes the possessor of the one right is also
the possessor of the other. Both doctrines are based on the
principle that a benefit has been conferred on defendant at the
expense of plaintiff, but the principle of indemnity is more limited
in application than that of subrogation, since not only must a benefit
be conferred on defendant by a discharge of his duty or obligation,
but the discharge must have occurred under circumstances in which
plaintiff was, at the same time, discharging a personal obligation
coextensive with that of defendant.
42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 3, page 566-67.
In other words, Phoenix Indemnity is not entitled to indemnification (only
subrogation) for the sums it paid for property damage or PIP because it was liable for
those sums whether Yardley was insured or not. The sums paid out for PIP and PD were
recoverable by subrogation under traditional principles of tort law and the application of
comparative negligence principles by a jury.

13

Generally, this objection is supported by repetition of the phrase "steps in shoes'
"privity of contract" and/or "plainly," "clearly" or other similar adverbs-masqueradingas-argument, but no real or substantive analysis is ever presented because there is none.
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The sums paid out because of Phoenix Indemnity's obligations which were exactly
coextensive with Yardley's obligations, on the other hand, are recoverable under implied
indemnification principles. And the fact and amount of Yardley's reimbursement
obligation is properly established as a matter of law.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted § 76 of the Restatement of Restitution, and
§ 76 sets forth examples to which it applies. The Restatement also acknowledges that
"the general principles [set forth in § 76] are applicable to many types of cases." Id. at p.
333. This case falls within the factual examples set forth in § 76 even though that section
does not specifically mention the uninsured motorist statute (or any of the other factual
circumstances to which the courts of the State of Utah have applied the concept). For
example, the "third-party tort rule" was adopted in South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d
1279 (Utah App. 1988). No particular name was given to the indemnity concept when
the court considered it in Salt Lake City Sch. Dist. v. Galbraith & Green, Inc., 740 P.2d
284 (Utah App. 1987), Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah
1984) and Hanover Limited v. Cessna Aircraft Co.. 758 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 1988). See
also Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997) (analyzing a
factual circumstance that would come within the "multiple sureties rule" although the
court's analysis focused on the doctrine of subrogation). The courts only require that the
three elements be met, and all three elements are met in this case.
Yardley would have the Court invest her with its powers, the powers reserved to
22

the plaintiff,14 and the powers reserved to the Legislature in order to declare that Phoenix
Indemnity's exclusive remedy is subject to her faulty understanding of subrogation.15
Yardley seeks to limit Phoenix Indemnity's remedies to that single remedy which she

14

The United States Supreme Court's analysis of a defendant's claim of federal
preemption is illustrative:
It is true that when a defense to a state claim is based on the terms of
a collective-bargaining agreement, the state court will have to
interpret that agreement to decide whether the state claim survives.
But the presence of a federal question, even a § 301 question, in a
defensive argument does not overcome the paramount policies
embodied in the well-pleaded complaint rule — that the plaintiff is
the master of the complaint, that a federal question must appear on
the face of the complaint, and that the plaintiff may, by eschewing
claims based on federal law, choose to have the cause heard in
state court. When a plaintiff invokes a right created by a
collective-bargaining agreement, the plaintiff has chosen to plead
what we have held must be regarded as a federal claim, and removal
is at the defendant's option. But a defendant cannot, merely by
injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly
a state-law claim, transform the action into one arising under federal
law, thereby selecting the forum in which the claim shall be litigated.
If a defendant could do so, the plaintiff would be master of
nothing.
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams. 482 U.S. 386, 395 (1987).
15

The term "subrogation" is used by the courts as shorthand for any cause of
action based upon the rights of a non-party. Such causes of action include, but are not
limited to, equitable subrogation, legal subrogation, statutory reimbursement, assignment,
trusts, indemnification, etc. See, e.g.. Bear River Mutual v. Wall 367 Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah
1999) (clarifying that prior use of "subrogation" to mean "statutory right of
reimbursement" did not limit the statutory right. The court explained: under the equitable
doctrine of subrogation, an insurer seeking PIP reimbursement would "stand in the shoes"
of its insured and would collect nothing because the insured's right to recover special
damages is abrogated by the no-fault statute, and the tortfeasor is granted immunity — if
she maintains insurance).
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deems acceptable — negligence. No legal authority was presented for the unlikely
proposition that the existence of one right necessarily precludes the existence of
alternative or cumulative rights or causes of action.
Yardley asks for this drastic alteration of the adversarial model of jurisprudence in
order to protect herself from the natural results of her own failure to maintain liability
insurance. The Equitable Doctrine of Subrogation is borne of equity and Implied
Indemnification is borne of equity. The only method by which Yardley could deny
Phoenix Indemnity's right to indemnification is the allegation and proof (i.e., admissible
evidence) that Phoenix Indemnity's right of indemnification would not be equitable.
Yardley has not presented such an argument — because no such argument can be made.16
For Yardley to establish a superior equity and thus to be entitled to prevail, she
must present proof which establishes that the damages paid in connection with Phoenix
Indemnity's settlement with its insured were paid in bad faith, fraudulently, or as a result
of collusion; otherwise, Phoenix Indemnity is entitled to full reimbursement of the
payment made by it to Jason Merrill.
The sums paid to Jason Merrill were paid because Phoenix Indemnity owed
obligations to him which were exactly coextensive with Yardley's obligations to him.
Therefore, such sums are recoverable under implied indemnification principles. The fact

16

In addition, Yardley comes to this Court with unclean hands; therefore, even if a
logical argument could be made, Yardley would be prevented from making it.
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and amount of Yardley's reimbursement obligation is properly established as a matter of
law.

VI.

THE OPINIONS FROM FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS WHICH
HAVE DENIED UM CARRIERS A RIGHT OF EQUITABLE
INDEMNITY ARE NOT PERSUASIVE.

Yardley opposed Phoenix Indemnity's motion for summary judgment by quoting
the conclusions reached by courts from foreign jurisdictions. The conclusions set forth
tenuously supported her assertions17 and she asked the district court to blindly adopt those
courts' conclusions. See Yardley's Opposition Memo at pp. 8-9 (quoting Shelter Ins. Co.
v. Arnold. 940 S.W.2d 505 (Ark. App. 1996); Russell v. Evans. 920 S.W.2d 161 (Mo.
App. 1996)). This Court may not blindly adopt the conclusions of foreign courts. In
order for the Court to follow a foreign jurisdiction's legal conclusion, the party proposing
the conclusion must prove that the underlying reasoning is both logical and persuasive.

17

Yardley also attempted to distinguish the foreign jurisdiction case cited by
Phoenix Indemnity in which the court acknowledged a UM carrier's right of equitable
indemnification from the uninsured motorist. Yardley's attempted distinction fails
because it takes the court's statement out of context. The court questioned the insurer's
superior right of equity only because of the fact that the insurer had missed the statute of
limitations applicable to its other causes of action because of its own decision to deny the
insured's claim and pursue a declaratory judgment action against him. The court's basis
for the comment quoted by Yardley is the maxim that equity will not protect or rescue
those who could have (but failed to) protect themselves. Coleman v. American
Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co.. 930 F. Supp. 255, (N.D. Miss. 1996). Yardley did not
question the fact that Phoenix Indemnity has a superior right in equity, and she may not
question that fact because of her unclean hands. See also Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 471 F.Supp. 1059 (M.D. Penn. 1979).
25

See, e.g., Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058 at n. 4 (Utah 1998) ("While
federal cases are instructive, and perhaps even persuasive, they are by no means
authoritative and certainly not controlling."). The cases relied upon by Yardley are
logically flawed and haphazardly reasoned.
The first flaw in the cases relied upon by Yardley is that the courts based their
conclusions on the fact that a UM carrier is contractually obligated18 to pay UM benefits
to its insured. The gravity of this truth is never explained, but its status as the foundation
of their rulings is clung to with white-knuckled tenacity.
The conclusion relied upon by Yardley was first set forth by the Indiana Court of
Appeals in 1972.19 American States Insurance Co. v. Williams, 278 N.E.2d 295 (Ind.
App. 1972). The court's reasoning in that case was perfunctory, to put it mildly.
Nevertheless, courts such as the Arkansas and Missouri courts quoted by Yardley in her
memorandum submitted to the district court, have blindly quoted Williams without ever
analyzing the flawed logic or the substantial changes to public policy effected by
mandatory, comprehensive automobile insurance regimes. See Farmers Insurance
Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985).

18

The foreign courts' archaic conclusions are based upon unarticulated
assumptions which pre-date modern mandatory automobile insurance statutes.
19

Every court (or nearly every court) that has rejected the application of implied
indemnity principles to uninsured motorist coverage has relied on Williams either directly
or indirectly through several layers that can be traced back to Williams.
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The foundation of the Williams conclusion is that indemnification was not
available because "the duty of the insurer to pay damages arises solely20 out of its contract
with its insured." Id at 299-300.
The first flaw is painfully obvious — to wit: The foundational basis for refusing to
acknowledge the right to indemnification is the first element of indemnification.
The first element of implied indemnity is: The prospective indemnitee must
discharge a legal obligation owed to a third party. See Salt Lake City Sch. Dist. v.
Galbraith & Green, Inc., 740 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 1987).
The second flaw inherent in the quoted foreign cases is the fact that the Financial
Responsibility statute did not exist in 1972 (at least not in Utah). As explained above, the
justifications underlying cases decided prior to the adoption of comprehensive, mandatory
insurance schemes are not dispositive in modem mandatory insurance practice. Even if
the Williams conclusion were well-reasoned in 1972 in Indiana, its conclusion would
carry no weight in Utah in the year 2001.
UM coverage is an indispensable element of the Financial Responsibility statute.
The legislature intended that all motorists should be protected from catastrophe. The
non-sequitur set forth by the Indiana, Arkansas, and Missouri cases relied upon by
Yardley is that because the first element of the cause of action for implied indemnity is

But see Utah Financial Responsibility Act.
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satisfied, that cause of action should be dismissed. This Court may not blindly adopt the
Williams conclusion.
Williams and its progeny do not purport to interpret Utah law, and they were
poorly reasoned when they were issued. Subsequent to the adoption of comprehensive
insurance schemes they are nothing more than worthless relics from a bygone era.

VII.

THE "LIABILITY" REFERENCED IN THE SECOND ELEMENT
OF THE THREE-PART TEST FOR IMPLIED INDEMNITY IS
SATISFIED BY MEETING THE ELEMENTS SET FORTH IN
THE RESTATEMENT AT § 78.

Yardley acknowledged that the facts of this case satisfy the first and third elements
of the three-part test for the application of implied indemnity principles. But Yardley
denied that she was "liable" for the debt because there had not been a jury trial to fix her
percentage of her negligence. See Opposition Memo at p. 10. Yardley's "liability" is not
negligence liability.21 Her "liability" is contractual liability because the undisputed facts

21

Yardley invoked (at pp. 10-11 of its opposition memorandum) the word
"culpability" from Hanover to support her view that this is a negligence action.
"Culpability" relates to "culpability" between the indemnitor and the indemnitee. The
fact that Yardley claims that the third party was comparatively negligent does not address
the legal precept referenced by the word "culpability." What it means is that where the
indemnitor and indemnitee are in pari delicto, no right of indemnification exists between
them (only contribution). Phoenix Indemnity was not in pari delicto with Yardley. The
other terms used to described this point of law are "active negligence" and "passive
negligence." One who is passively negligent (i.e., one who is vicariously negligent such
as a UM carrier or an employer) may recover in indemnity from one who is actively
negligent (such as Yardley). If Phoenix Indemnity were actively negligent (i.e., if it had
driven one of the vehicles that collided), it would be precluded from maintaining a claim
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satisfy the elements set forth in § 78 of the Restatement of Restitution.
When Yardley chose to drive an uninsured vehicle and negligently injure Jason
Merrill, she entered into a contract22 with Phoenix Indemnity as a matter of law. She is
bound by those contractual obligations which include the full reimbursement of the
amount Phoenix Indemnity paid to Jason Merrill.
Yardley has expressed her opinion that the comparative negligence attributable to
Jason Merrill23 is relevant to her contractual obligations. Yardley ignores the fact that
for equitable indemnity. That is the reason why Yardley repeatedly attempts to attribute
Jason Merrill's claimed comparative negligence to Phoenix Indemnity. In sum, under
subrogation, an insured's negligence is attributed to the subrogated insurer, but under
implied indemnity, Phoenix Indemnity maintains its own cause of action for its own
conduct — the payment of Yardley's liability.
22

Yardley will, undoubtedly, assert that her indemnity obligations are limited to
60% of the $24,040.00 that she owes under the implied contract. Yardley's negligence
percentage as determined by the jury does not affect her obligations to Phoenix
Indemnity. In another context, the court enunciated the distinction between contractual
obligations and tort liability: "We reject C.T.'s argument that the Personal Injury Payment
("PIP") made by his own insurer establishes the threshold amount for his medical
expenses. The mere fact that his PIP insurer paid for medical expenses which the jury
found were not related to the accident should not be binding on Johnson for purposes
of establishing the medical expenses threshold and exposing Johnson to liability for
general damages. This is especially so since a PIP carrier has a first party contractual
relationship with its insured — in this case C.T. — and owes certain duties to him. C.T.
v. Johnson. 1999 UT 35, 977 P.2d 479 at n.3.
23

Yardley claimed that the enforcement of the terms of the implied contract are
subject to the elements ofres judicata. Phoenix Indemnity stated in its opening
memorandum before the district court that the amount it paid had a res judicata effect.
That is the case because the amount paid by Phoenix Indemnity established the amount of
Yardley's obligation. But this obligation is not owed because of doctrine ofres judicata.
It is owed because that is one of the terms of the implied contract into which Yardley
29

Phoenix Indemnity's duties were exactly coextensive with her liability. All defenses of
comparative negligence, proximate causation, and damages were available to and invoked
by Phoenix Indemnity. The existence of a professed defense to her negligence does not
prevent the application of principles of indemnification. Because Phoenix Indemnity only
paid Jason Merrill as a result of Yardley's failure to maintain liability insurance, Phoenix
Indemnity is entitled to restitution. This is true because Yardley's failure to maintain
insurance constitutes "fault," as such Yardley is "liable" under the implied contract into
which she entered with Phoenix Indemnity.
The Restatement of Restitution addresses this issue as follows:
A person who with another became subject to an obligation or
supposed obligation upon which, as between the two, the other had a
prior duty of performance, and who has made payment thereon
although the other had a defense thereto,
*

(b)

*

*

is entitled to restitution if he became subject to the
obligation with the consent of or because of the fault of the
other and if in making payment, he acted
(a)

in the discharge of his own duty to the creditor, or

entered.
Moreover, some courts have held that a stipulated agreement between two adverse
parties is a final judgment on the merits sufficient to invoke claim preclusion in a
subsequent case between the same parties. See, e ^ , Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork
Pipeline Co.. 913 P.2d 731 (Utah 1995) (citing In re Medomak Canning. 922 F.2d 895,
900 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that court-approved settlement has res judicata effect)).
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(b)

in the justifiable beiief[24] that such duty existed, or

(c)

in response to a judgment rendered against him after a
reasonable defense because of such transaction, or

(d)

performance was required by business compulsion.

Restatement of Restitution, Title A, Indemnity at § 78 (emphasis added).

A.

Yardley's "Fault" or "Consent" Was Her Failure to
Maintain Insurance.

Yardley claims that her "fault" must be her percentage of negligence as determined
by a jury. Yardley's constant attempt to inject negligence principles into this contractual
dispute does not obviate the fact that Yardley's "fault" was her failure to maintain
liability insurance for the protection of innocent victims of her negligence. Because of
her "fault" she "consented" to enter into an implied contract wherein she promised to
indemnify Phoenix Indemnity in exchange for the provision of liability insurance
coverage.
Under § 78, the settlement negotiated and paid by the indemnitee may be
recovered from the indemnitor if (under part (b)) the sums are paid because of the consent
or fault of the indemnitor. The Utah Supreme Court referenced Black's Law Dictionary's

24

Yardley could have raised the objection (and attempted to prove) that Phoenix
Indemnity intentionally paid Jason Merrill without a reasonable belief of its obligation to
do so. Yardley has not made such an objection (not even a bald assertion). Phoenix
Indemnity paid what it justifiably believed it (and Yardley) owed. Therefore, Yardley's
"liability" is established as a matter of law.
31

definition of the word "fault" in Field v. Boyer Co, L.C., 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998).
Black's Law Dictionary 608 (6th ed. 1990) defines "fault" in just
that fashion: "Negligence; an error or defect of judgment or of
conduct; any deviation from prudence, duty, or rectitude; any
shortcoming, or neglect of care or performance resulting from
inattention, incapacity, or perversity; a wrong tendency, course, or
act; bad faith or mismanagement; neglect of duty." This definition is
[very] b r o a d . . . .
Id. (emphasis added). Yardley deviated from her duty to maintain liability insurance
coverage. Failing to maintain insurance for the benefit and protection of innocent victims
is a sufficient shortcoming to constitute "fault" under the broad definition set forth in
Black's and adopted by the Utah Supreme Court.

VIII. PHOENIX INDEMNITY'S SETTLEMENT OF JASON
MERRILL'S CLAIM DOES NOT AFFECT ITS RIGHT TO
INDEMNIFICATION.
It has often been stated by the Utah Supreme Court that "[settlements are favored
in the law, and should be encouraged, because of the obvious benefits accruing not only
to the parties, but also to the judicial system." Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v.
Travelstead. 592 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979). Phoenix Indemnity's settlement with Jason
Merrill does not preclude the application of implied indemnity principles.
[A] person who is liable for injuries caused by the negligence or
wrongful act of another may adjust and pay the claim therefor and
need not wait the result of a suit in order to be entitled to indemnity
from the wrongdoer....
42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 25, page 603.
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[T]he right to indemnity against an actual wrongdoer exists whether
the one proceeded against in the first instance settles the loss
voluntary or has a judgment recovered against him. In other words,
the fact of voluntary payment does not negative the right to
indemnity.
Globe Indemnity Company v. Schmitt 53 N.E.2d 790 (Ohio 1944). In this case, the
wrongdoer/indemnitor declined to maintain insurance or defend the proceeding; therefore,
the third person/insured proceeded against the UM carrier/indemnitee thus requiring the
indemnitee to carry the burden. Thus, the wrongdoer/indemnitor is conclusively bound
by any reasonable good faith settlement the indemnitee may make. See Restatement of
Restitution, Title A, Indemnity at § 76(f) (stating that settlement amounts have a res
judicata effect only if the facts are addressed by § 76(f) (involving a lawsuit) or § 78
(involving the indemnitee's personal obligation or a business compulsion)). The only
defenses available to Yardley are collusion and bad faith settlement. Such defenses have
not been alleged by Yardley.

IX.

PHOENIX INDEMNITY'S RECOVERY OF UM BENEFITS AND
ATTORNEY FEES IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING YARDLEY AND ARE DETERMINABLE
WITHOUT THE NECESSITY OF A TRIAL.

Alternatively, an implied contract between Yardley and Phoenix Indemnity or a
separate and distinct right of recovery arose because, otherwise, Yardley would be
unjustly enriched. Quantum meruit has two branches, both rooted in justice. See Scheller
v. Dixie Six Corp.. 753 P.2d 971, 975 (Utah App. 1988). The remedy provided under
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quantum meruit is one of restitution designed to restore to a plaintiff a benefit unjustly
enjoyed by a defendant. See Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams. 564
P.2d 773, 776 (Utah 1977).
A,

Unjust Enrichment.

Phoenix Indemnity may prevail on an unjust enrichment theory by proving three
elements: "'(I) a benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) an appreciation or
knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention by the
conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the
conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value.'" American Towers Owners
Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182, 1192 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted).
B.

Contract Implied In Fact.

The second branch of quantum meruit, contract implied in fact, is an actual
contract established by conduct. See Davies v. Olson. 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah App.
1987). The elements of a contract implied in fact are: (1) the defendant requested the
plaintiff to provide services; (2) the plaintiff expected the defendant to compensate it for
those services; and (3) the defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiff
expected compensation. Id
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C.

YarcUey May N o t Retain U n j u s t
Enrichment.

1.

First Element:
(a)

Phoenix Indemnity conferred a benefit on Yardley.

Yardley was neither sued nor molested by Jason Merrill. This is because Phoenix
Indemnity stepped into the breach created by Yardley's failure to maintain liability
insurance. Phoenix Indemnity acted as Yardley's liability insurer: It defended her, it
adjusted the claim, and it paid the amounts she owed. It is undisputed that Phoenix
Indemnity meets the first element to entitle it to a remedy for unjust enrichment.
(b)

Yardley Requested (because the Law Imputes a
Request) That Phoenix Indemnity Provide UM
Coverage as a Result of the Collision.

An uninsured motorist's failure to maintain liability insurance coverage is a
request for services from a UM carrier, as a matter of law. Liability insurance is
mandatory and uninsured motorists are freeloaders who increase the cost of insurance for
those who pay premiums. The goal of liability insurance is to protect innocent victims.
Therefore, the Court may properly infer from the structure of Utah's Financial
Responsibility statute a legislative intent to impute a request for coverage from the
victim's UM carrier to uninsured motorists. See Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 268
(Utah App. 1987) (quoting 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 18 (1963) (noting that
implied contracts impose contractive duty by reason of promissory expression and are no
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different than express contracts, although different in mode of expressing assent)).
Yardley's mode of expressing assent to Phoenix Indemnity's provision of services for
which she was primarily responsible was her failure to maintain liability insurance.
2.

Second Element:
(a)

Yardley Knew About the Benefits Conferred Upon Her
by Phoenix Indemnity.

Yardley knew about Phoenix Indemnity's provision of these benefits to her as
evidenced by the letter from her attorney. See Exhibit B attached to Phoenix Indemnity's
opening memorandum. Moreover, the law imputes knowledge of the benefit to her for
the reasons set forth above. Yardley's knowledge or imputed knowledge is not disputed.
(b)

Phoenix Indemnity Provided UM Benefits to Jason
Merrill With the Expectation That Yardley Would
Reimburse It.

Phoenix Indemnity expected reimbursement from Yardley. When Phoenix
Indemnity settled Jason Merrill's claims against Yardley, it demanded and received an
agreement from Jason Merrill in which he agreed to assist Phoenix Indemnity in
recovering from Yardley. See Exhibit F attached to Phoenix Indemnity's opening
memorandum. Phoenix Indemnity's expectation of reimbursement is not disputed.
3.

Third Element:
(a)

Yardley's Retention of the Benefits Bestowed Upon
Her by Phoenix Indemnity Would be Inequitable.

It would be grossly inequitable for Yardley to retain the benefits bestowed upon
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her by Phoenix Indemnity. Although Phoenix Indemnity bestowed a benefit upon
Yardley, it never intended that she retain the benefits. If Yardley were permitted to retain
the benefits bestowed upon her, she (and all other uninsured motorists) would be given
judicially-sanctioned freeloader status. The efficient operation of automobile insurance
for the benefit and protection of those who pay their premiums cannot continue where
freeloaders are permitted to retain all of the benefits of insurance coverage without paying
any premiums. Yardley's retention of the benefits bestowed upon her by Phoenix
Indemnity would be unjust and inequitable. Therefore, as a matter of law, Yardley owes
reimbursement of the payment made to Jason Merrill as UM benefits.
(b)

Yardley Knew or Should Have Known that Phoenix
Indemnity Would Expect Her to Reimburse It.

Yardley knew, should have known, or knowledge is properly imputed to her,
whether personally or through her attorneys, that Phoenix Indemnity would expect
reimbursement of the sums it paid to Jason Merrill on her behalf.

X.

PHOENIX INDEMNITY IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT IN
THE AMOUNT WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FULL
REIMBURSEMENT, INCLUDING COSTS AND ATTORNEY
FEES.

Phoenix Indemnity is entitled to recover its costs and attorney fees from Yardley:
[I]f the party secondarily liable on an obligation is obliged to pay the
obligation, he is entitled to full reimbursement from the party
primarily liable.
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42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 20, page 595. And full reimbursement includes costs and attorney
fees because Phoenix Indemnity is entitled to be saved harmless. "An indemnitee is not
'held harmless' . . . if it must incur expenses to vindicate its rights." Hanover Limited v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 1988) (permitting recovery of attorney fees
incurred in connection with defending against secondary liability, but denying25 an
indemnitee attorney fees incurred in connection with enforcing the implied indemnity
contract); see also South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack. 765 P.2d 1279, 1282-83 (Utah App.
1988); Collier v. Heinz. 827 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1992) (explaining that the award of
attorney fees as consequential damages, outside the context of statutory and contractual
authorization — including implied contractual authorizations such as explained above —
should be limited to two situations: insurance contracts and the third-party exception).
Under the circumstances of this case involving insurance, attorney fees may be
considered an item of consequential damages if the attorney fees were foreseeable. See
Canvon Country Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d 414, 419-20 (Utah 1989). Attorney fees are
recoverable if they were "reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably
foreseeable by, the parties at the time the [implied] contract was made." Beck v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985).

25

Phoenix Indemnity acknowledges that under the general rule it would not be
entitled to recover attorney fees for enforcing the indemnity contract, but this case is
distinguishable from the cases applying the general rule.
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This litigation is a "natural consequence" or a "reasonably foreseeable" result of
Yardley's breach of her obligations which are mandated by statute for the protection of
the public. It falls under the maxim that every man (or woman or insurance company)
must be held to intend the natural and probable consequence of his deeds.
Second, the third-party tort rule provides for an award of attorney fees. The Utah
Court of Appeals described the rule as follows:
[W]hen the natural consequences of one's negligence is another's
involvement in a dispute with a third party, attorney fees reasonably
incurred in resolving the dispute are recoverable from the negligent
party as an element of damages.
South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d 1279, 1282-83 (Utah App. 1988).
In this case, Yardley negligently injured Jason Merrill while she was performing
the business of her employer. Under these circumstances, litigation with her, her
employer or her employer's insurance company is a natural consequence26 of her

26

The Utah Supreme Court has used the phrase "natural consequence" to denote
foreseeable result by defining special damages. "Special damages are a particular type of
damages which are a natural consequence of the injury caused but are not the type of
damages that necessarily flow from the harmful act." Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811
P.2d 151 (Utah 1991) (citing Cohn v. J.C. Pennev. 537 P.2d 306, 307 (Utah 1975)
("Special damages are those which occur as a natural consequence of the harm done but
are not so certain to flow therefrom as to be implied in law.") (emphasis added)).
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Richards v. Standard Accident
Ins. Co., 200 P. 1017, 1023 (Utah 1921) {quoting Western Commercial Travelers' Assoc,
v. Smith, 85 F. 401, 405 (8th Cir. 1898)) "defined 'the natural and probable consequence'
of an act as follows: 'The natural consequence of means used [is] the consequence which
ordinarily follows from their use-the result which may be reasonably anticipated from
their use, and which ought to be expected.'" Allstate Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 904 F. Supp.
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negligence. Moreover, the vehicle driven by Yardley was not insured at the time of her
accident, therefore, the prospect of third-party litigation becomes not only natural; rather
it was a foregone conclusion.

XI.

YARDLEY'S UNCLEAN HANDS PREVENTS THE COURT
FROM CONSIDERING HER DEFENSES TO
REIMBURSEMENT.

Yardley did not do equity; therefore, she may not seek equity. Despite Yardley's
failure to maintain liability insurance covering the vehicle operated by her at the time of
the collision, Yardley operated the vehicle on public roads. Yardley's failure to comply
with the statutory requirement of liability coverage for the protection of innocent victims

1270, 1279 (D. Utah 1995) {quoting Richards, 200 P. at 1023) (alteration in original)
(anticipating Utah law in defining "accident" as used in homeowner's policy).
In addition, in Pacific Coast, the defendant had issued a bond indemnifying
plaintiff title company from any loss resulting from defaults by a builder, the Court
examined the rule for recovering damages for breach of contract and its emphasis on
foreseeability. The Court concluded with this analysis:
[I]t could reasonably be foreseen that the natural and usual
consequence of Cassady's failure to pay the laborers and
materialmen would bring about the series of events which occurred:
that liens would be filed and legal proceedings instituted to enforce
them; that plaintiff Title Company, having the duty to keep the titles
clear, would interpose defenses and attend to some disposition of the
claims, which would require the services of attorneys....
Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Ind. Co.. 325 P.2d 906, 908 (Utah
1958). The same analysis applies to the instant case as was employed in Pacific Coast —
Phoenix Indemnity's employment of attorneys to sue Yardley was a natural consequence
of Yardley's negligence. Therefore, equity demands that its attorney fees be recoverable
from Yardley.
40

is misconduct27 that renders any pleas for equity by Yardley to be disregarded by the
Court. "No maxim of equity is older or more venerated than 'He who seeks redress in a
court of equity must come with clean hands.' The very foundation of equity is good
conscience, and any conduct in connection with the matter in controversy which does not
comport with good conscience should preclude any relief being granted." Dowse v.
Kammerman. 246 P.2d 881 (Utah 1952) (Crockett, J. dissenting).

XII.

THE AFFIDAVIT SUBMITTED TO THE DISTRICT COURT IS
SUFFICIENT FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES.

The one-third contingency fee set forth in the affidavit submitted to the district
court is standard in the industry for recovery of UM benefits. Moreover, the affidavit of
Taylor D. Carr provides the Court with sworn testimony that he and his firm were
retained on a one-third contingency basis and have incurred many hours of effort in
attempting to collect the judgment. Therefore, Phoenix Indemnity is entitled to be
reimbursed for the attorney fees that it is required to pay to its attorneys.
Lastly, findings are unnecessary to support an award of attorney fees where the
relevant facts are undisputed. See Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 P.2d 1039,

27

"Misconduct which will bar relief in a court of equity need not necessarily be of
such nature as to be punishable as crime or to constitute the basis of legal action. Under
this maxim, any willful act in regard to the matter in litigation, which would be
condemned and pronounced wrongful by honest and fair-minded men, will be sufficient
to make the hands of the applicant unclean." Dowse v. Kammerman. 246 P.2d 881
(Utah 1952) (Crockett, J. dissenting).
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1040 (Utah 1975) (attorney fees may be awarded on summary judgment if the record
contains a stipulation, an unrebutted affidavit, or evidence supporting the reasonableness
of the award); South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d 1279 (Utah App. 1988)
(uncontroverted testimony concerning amount of reasonable fee provides adequate basis
for fee award).

CONCLUSION
This appeal concerns the enforcement of an implied contract. The terms of the
implied contract arose as a matter of law, are governed by equity, and are not disputed.
The Court may properly apply the legal precepts set forth in §§ 76 and 78 of the
Restatement of Restitution to the undisputed facts of this case. All of the elements of
equitable indemnification are satisfied by the undisputed facts.
In addition to full reimbursement, Phoenix Indemnity's attorney fees are a
recoverable measure of consequential damages in this case. Judgment should enter
against Yardley for damages owing under the implied indemnity contract in the sum of
$40,868.00.
DATED this XXday

of March, 2001.
CARR & WADDOUPS
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J ^ T d a y of March, 2001, a true and correct
copy of Brief of Appellant Pkoenix Indemnity Insurance Company was mailed,
via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:

Mr. Paul M. Belnap
STRONG & HANNI
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Paul M. Belnap, #0279
Darren K. Nelson, #7946
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendants
Sixth Floor Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)532-7080

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, MANTI DEPARTMENT
PHOENIX INDEMNITY INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARLENE T. SMITH, aka MARLENE
YARDLEY and YARDLEY INN, a Utah
limited liability company,
Defendant.

;
;
])
)
])
)
;
;
]I

ORDER RE MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND MOTION FOR
CONTINUANCE

]i

Judge David L. Mower

Civil No. 980600228

The above entitled matter came on for hearing on February 16, 2000 before the
Honorable David L. Mower with the parties appearing through their counsel of record. The
matters before the court were Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for
Continuance.
The issues having been briefed by the parties as well as argued orally and the Court

having considered the written memoranda and the oral arguments and being fully advised in the
premises, the Court determined that Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Motion for Continuance should be denied.
1. With respect to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Court has
determined that there are no disputed issues of fact, and therefore, the Court decides the same as
a matter of law.
2. Based upon the pleadings filed by the defendants and oral argument by the
defendants' counsel, the Court treats defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment as a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Claims of Breach of Implied Indemnity Contract, Unjust Enrichment and Restitution.
2. Based upon the pleadings and argument provided to the Court, the Court agrees
with the argument of the defendants and determines that as a matter of law there is no implied
contract as between plaintiffs and defendants. Simply put, an implied indemnity claim or any
other claim under quasi contract principles as against the defendants are not proper causes of
action in this context. Accordingly, plaintiffs may not proceed under a theory of implied
indemnity as against the defendants. Likewise, as a matter of law, plaintiffs do not have any
other quasi contract claim as against the defendants, including but not limited to, unjust
enrichment, restitution and the like.
3. To the extent that plaintiffs may recover as against the defendants, plaintiffs must
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establish that the defendants' negligence or proportion of fault is greater than that of Phoenix
Indemnity's insured, Jason David Merrill, and that such negligence or fault was the proximate
cause of damages, if any, suffered by Jason David Merrill.
4. Based upon plaintiffs' counsel's representations that plaintiffs no longer seek a
continuance in this matter, the motion for continuance is denied.
Based upon the foregoing, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.
2. Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Continuance is DENIED.
DATED this [}_ day of March, 2000.
BY THE COURT:

Q/i^
David L. Mower
District Court Judge

Approved as to form:

Trent J. Waddoups
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this /

day of^cbruaiy, 2000 a true and correct copy of the

foregoing Order re: Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for Continuace was mailed, first
class postage prepaid, to:
Taylor D. CanTrent J. Waddoups
CARR & WADDOUPS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
8 East Broadway, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Telephone: (801) 363-0888
Fax: (801)363-8512
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, MANTI DEPARTMENT
PHOENIX INDEMNITY INSURANCE
COMPANY and
JASON DAVID MERRILL,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.

MARLENE T. SMITH, a.k.a. MARLENE
YARDLEY, and YARDLEY INN, a Utah
limited liability company,

Civil No. 9 8 0 6 0 0 2 2 8
Judge David L. Mower

Defendants.

Based upon the Stipulated Motion submitted by Plaintiffs and Defendants, Utah R
Civ. P. 41(a)(2), and for good cause appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled action be, and hereby is,
DISMISSED.
DATED th

of My, 2000.

BY THE COURT:

QJI^
Honorable David L. Mower
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

